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INTRODUCTION
On January 20, 2011, the University of Connecticut’s
(“UConn”) athletic department received a scathing letter from
major donor Robert Burton.1 Burton, a highly successful
printing industry executive, has donated over $7 million to
support both academic and athletic programs at the
University.2 A former college football player and NFL draft
pick, Burton shares a love of football with his three sons, one
of whom served as team captain for the Huskies in 1999.3
1. The portions of Burton’s January 19, 2011 letter to former UConn athletic
director Jeff Hathaway that are of particular relevance to this Note read:
“[A]s the largest donor in the UConn football program. . .I told you that I
wanted to be involved in the hiring process for the new coach. I also gave you
my insight about who would be a good fit for the head coaching position as
well as who would not. . .For someone who has given over $7,000,000 to the
football program/university, I do not feel as though these requests were asking
for too much. . .To be crystal clear, I was not looking for veto power over the
next hire; I just wanted to be kept in the loop and add value and comments on
any prospective candidates. . .You and your committee of three talked to some
coaches and made a critical decision about who you were going to hire without
input from knowledgeable people who care about the program. . .You do not
have the skills to manage and cultivate new donors or the ability to work with
coaches. . .I did not graduate from UConn, but my son Mike and his wife are
UConn grads, and UConn did give me an honorary PhD. . .I earned my voice
on this subject as your number one football donor/supporter, by naming the
Burton Family Football Complex and by giving millions of dollars in
scholarship money to UConn’s football players and its Business School. . .I
supported [the former coach’s] football camp as a sponsor and gave thousands
of dollars for additional requests for things like artwork at the football
complex and an audio system for the player’s weight room. . .I am fully
qualified to assess coaches and their ability to match up with the university’s
needs, and I have done so for football programs from Vanderbilt to New
Haven, as well as several schools in the Ohio Valley Conference and [the] Big
Ten. . .After this slap in the face and embarrassment to my family, we are so
upset that we are out of UConn. . .What that means is that we do not want to
deal with people like you and your committee, who we do not trust and cannot
count on to make the correct decisions or do anything right with our
money. . .We want our money and respect back. . .Over the past years, the
Burton family has donated over $31 million to support special education and
scholarship programs in America. . .It is a shame that UConn will not be on
our list going forward.”
Letter from Robert Burton, Univ. of Conn. Donor to Jeffrey Hathaway, Former Univ. of
Conn. Athletic Dir. (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://www.ctpost.com/sports/
item/Burton-s-letter-to-UConn-3855.php [hereinafter Burton letter].
2. Neil Vigdor and Rob Varnon, UConn booster Burton: Hit man with a heart –
and a football addiction, CONN. POST, Feb. 1, 2011, available at
http://www.ctpost.com/local/article/UConn-booster-Burton-Hit-man-with-a-heart-and989760.php - page-1.
3. Id. As a student, Burton was the recipient of a full scholarship from his alma
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While he has contributed to UConn academics by establishing
two endowed scholarship funds, it was Burton’s $2.5 million
gift towards the construction of a new $50 million on-campus
football complex in 2002 that helped launch the program into
Division IA, and earned Burton recognition as UConn’s most
valuable booster.4 Yet just nine years later, in 2011, on the
heels of the most successful season in UConn football’s
history, Robert Burton asked for his money back.5
A booster like Robert Burton is every college athletic
program’s dream.
In 2006, only 19 of the 119 total
universities in the Football Bowl Subdivision netted an actual
profit from their respective programs.6 On average, only
sixteen universities broke even between 2004 and 2006.7
With the vast majority ending their seasons in the red,
philanthropy has become vital to the success and prestige of
college athletic programs.8 Booster dollars translate to stateof-the-art facilities, top-of-the-line equipment, and cream-ofthe-crop recruits. This recipe for athletic success often spills
over onto the university’s plate as well, as schools reap
notable benefits from national exposure.9 In this age of highprofile Division I football and basketball, where professionallevel stakes continue to erode the amateurism of decades
past, athletic departments feel pressure when it comes to
cultivating and nurturing relationships with major donors.10
mater, Murray State University in Kentucky. He was captain of the Murray State
football team, a four-year first team starter, and an All-American selection in his senior
year. After graduating, he was a 19th-round selection of the San Francisco 49ers and
later signed with the Buffalo Bills.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See MATTHEW DENHART ET AL., CTR. FOR COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY AND
PRODUCTIVITY, THE ACADEMICS ATHLETICS TRADE-OFF 29 (2009), available at
http://www.centerforcollegeaffordability.org/uploads/athletics.pdf.
7. Id
8. Id.
9. For example, after Northwestern University’s appearance in the 1996 Rose
Bowl, the University boasted a 30% increase in applications for the upcoming academic
year. Id. at 6.
10. The Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, established
with the purpose of identifying ways to prevent athletic programs from interfering with
the academic integrity of American institutions, referred to the growing competition
between colleges for the acquisition of resources as an “arms race.” See Knight Found.
Comm’n on Intercollegiate Athletics, A Call to Action: Reconnecting College Sports and
(2001),
http://knightcommission.org/images/pdfs/
Higher
Education
25
2001_knight_report.pdf; James P. Strode, Donor Motives to Giving to Intercollegiate
Athletics 1-2 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the Ohio State University),
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And as the Burton letter demonstrates, hell hath no fury
like a booster scorned. When UConn’s athletic department
sought to replace departing head football coach Randy Edsall
in early 2011, Burton ignited a feud with UConn athletic
director Jeff Hathaway that garnered national media
coverage after he was not consulted in the decision. As copies
of the very expressive letter were leaked to the press, Burton
was pegged as. . .well, a prima donor. But are multi-milliondollar boosters like Robert Burton justified in their
expectation of influence over a collegiate athletic program?
Part I of this Note will discuss the vital role boosters play
in college athletics, and will explain why colleges,
universities, and other non-profit organizations have
increasingly relied upon the generosity of donors in recent
years. Additionally, this section will explore the various
motives that drive philanthropic giving, specifically focusing
on how power, control, and influence may motivate major
donors in college sports.
Part II will redirect towards a discussion of the traditional
legal relationships and conflicts arising between donors and
institutions, and will stress the importance of clear donative
intent in gift agreements. This section will also deconstruct
the common law barrier to donor standing – an obstacle that
historically prevented the merits of many donor-initiated
claims from being heard and resolved.
Part III will introduce the emerging phenomenon of
venture philanthropy, a departure from more traditional
methods of charitable giving that affords donors the ability to
manage and oversee their funds. It will include an analysis of
Smithers v. St. Luke’s/Roosevelt Hospital, a landmark case
for donor standing, specifically focusing on what constitutes a
“special interest” in a charitable organization.11
Finally, this Note will compare and contrast collegiate
boosters like Robert Burton with venture philanthropists and
other donors who reserve managerial rights for themselves
when conferring gifts to institutions. It will conclude by
finding that, despite the growing need for financial assistance
from donors in collegiate athletics, accepting certain
available
at
http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Strode%20James%20Patrick.pdf?
osu1148304953 [hereinafter “Strode”].
11. See Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2001).
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restricted gifts – those with considerably tight strings
attached – may only serve to further erode the integrity and
amateurism of the NCAA.
I: MODERN DONORS: THE TREND TOWARDS CONTROL
Due to our nation’s current economic climate, American
universities, charitable foundations, and other non-profit
entities have experienced a significant decline in funding from
state and local governments.12 In response to the downturn,
these institutions have been forced to seek alternative
College athletic departments are
financial resources.13
especially susceptible to the sting of inadequate funding, as
the expenses of the majority of college sports programs
substantially outweigh revenues.14 Approximately 75% of
NCAA Division I programs lose money annually, while the
expenses necessary to maintain competitiveness continue to
increase each year.15 To close the funding gap, athletic
departments have increasingly relied upon philanthropic
giving.16 For instance, in 1965, donations from boosters
accounted for 5% of athletic revenues. But today, donors
contribute nearly 20%.17
Soliciting contributions from donors has become vital to
the success and sustainability of not only college athletic
programs, but charities and non-profits as well. As such,
these institutions continually strive to understand the
psychology of philanthropic giving. Philanthropy as we
understand it today is a relatively new concept. In the United
States, the practice emerged and developed in the 20th
century with the establishment of private foundations by
industrial giants like Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller.18 Yet
these champions of industry did not give with both hands –
rather, wealthy donors traditionally utilized private
foundations as a means of retaining control over their
12. Strode, supra note 10, at 1.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See generally INDERJEET PARMAR, FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CENTURY:
THE FORD, CARNEGIE, & ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATIONS IN THE RISE OF AMERICAN
POWER (2012) (discussing how the philanthropic foundations established by the “Big 3”
influenced American society and politics in the twentieth century).
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charitable gifts.19 In lieu of donating assets directly to an
institution or organization, establishing a private foundation
afforded donors the ability to oversee the management and
distribution of their funds.20 Though the practice and advent
of philanthropy in our society is far more widespread than it
was during Rockefeller’s time, donors of the 21st century are
becoming increasingly demanding with respect to control and
management of their gifts.21 In the view of one commentator,
“society has moved and is continuing to move toward a
results-oriented,
quasi-commercial,
social
engineer’s
conception of charity.”22
To gain perspective on why this attitudinal shift in
philanthropy has occurred, and perhaps begin to understand
UConn football booster Robert Burton’s outrage, it is helpful
to examine the theories behind why people give in the first
place.
In recent decades, numerous studies have been
conducted to measure donor motivation.23 Specifically, “[t]he
instruments developed by sport researchers have focused on a
range of motives for giving, from psychosocial constructs such
as feelings of loyalty to tangible benefits such as preferential
seating for football games.”24 A 2006 study, conducted at a
large football-oriented Midwestern university, developed a
model that narrowed the range of athletic booster motives to
just four: achievement, affiliation, philanthropy, and power.25
According to the study’s results, achievement ranked the
highest among the four, leading the researchers to conclude
that “donors give money in an effort to fulfill vicarious
19. See Alan F. Rothschild, Jr., How Donors May – and May Not – Exercise Control
of Charitable Gifts, 16 TXNEXEMPT 110 (2004).
20. Id. at 10.
21. Id.
22. This social shift reflects the quasi-professional shift that has occurred in
collegiate athletics. Programs are becoming increasingly “results-oriented,” and many
commentators argue that big-time Division I football and men’s basketball programs
are teetering on the verge of commercialization. Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar
Charity: A Historical Analysis of America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2437, 2439 (2005).
23. See, e.g., JOSEPH C. SMITH JR. ET AL., ATHLETIC FUND-RAISING: EXPLORING
THE MOTIVES BEHIND DONATIONS 2-3 (1989); E.J. Staurowsky, B. Parkhouse, and M.
Sachs, Developing An Instrument to Measure Athletic Donor Behavior and Motivation,
10 J. SPORT MANAGEMENT 262, 262-277 (1996); J.M. Gladden et al., Toward a Better
Understanding of College Athletic Donors: What Are the Primary Motives? 14(1) SPORT
MARKETING QUARTERLY 18, 18-30 (2005).
24. Strode, supra note 10, at 33.
25. Id. at ii.
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triumphs concurrent with successful athletic squads.”26
Affiliation, which links charitable giving with a donor’s sense
of belonging, placed second.27 The philanthropy motive, which
sought to measure the number of donors giving without
expecting something in return, ranked third.28 Power ranked
last among the four motives, suggesting that at this
particular university, the donors surveyed did not have an
especially strong expectation of a quid pro quo relationship
with the institution.29
The finding that power ranks lowest among donor motives
in college athletics is something of an anomaly. Despite its
low ranking, researchers and analysts studying donor
motivation do not discount power as a viable “hidden” motive.
Because the majority of research conducted on donor
motivation relies upon the honesty of respondents, it is
reasonable that the stigma attached to the “desire for power”
deters participants from speaking truthfully.30 “[I]t may be
viewed as faux pas to divulge [that] the reason for engaging in
philanthropic behavior is to gain power. People may wish to
think that their gift is an altruistic gesture, rather than a
selfish act for personal gain.”31
Other studies on
philanthropic motivation support the theory that great
contribution and great expectation go hand-in-hand.
Research conducted by the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana
University concluded that, while motives for giving are
consistent along the economic spectrum from poor to wealthy,
when major donors contribute major dollars toward a purpose
of their choice, they “invariably want to shape rather than
merely support” that cause.32
Ample evidence from the world of college sports, including
the Burton letter, supports the hypothesis that some donors
give to athletic programs with an unspoken expectation of
access and influence. When that agenda is exposed, however,
26. Id. at 82.
27. Id. at 83.
28. Id. at 83-84.
29. Id. at 84.
30. Strode, supra note 10 at 85.
31. Id.
32. Paul G. Schervish, Major Donors, Major Motives: The People and Purposes
Behind Major Gifts, in 16 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR PHILANTHROPIC GIVING 85, 86 (Dwight
F. Burlingame, Timothy L. Seiler, Eugene R. Tempel eds., 1997), available at
http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/research_sites/cwp/pdf/majordonors.pdf.
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donors and institutions alike may feel repercussions – be they
mere disapproving jeers from the sports community, or fullscale sanctions from the NCAA. In 2005, Logan Young, an
athletics booster at the University of Alabama was convicted
of bribery in federal court for using his financial influence to
seek out top high school recruits for the University.33 Most
recently, and most notoriously, former University of Miami
football booster Nevin Shapiro allegedly doled out thousands
of proscribed benefits to at least seventy-three Miami football
players from 2002 through 2010.34 It is wholly plausible that
the stigma created by these public scandals involving illicit
boosters would deter an average donor from admitting even
their slightest expectation of access and influence.
Nevertheless, as evidenced by research and real-world
prototypes, the power motive is not to be discounted.
Yet not all power-thirsty donors cause headaches for their
respective institutions and the NCAA. In fact, quid pro quo
donations in college sports are not unheard of. Many athletics
booster clubs have developed some sort of progressive scale of
dollar amounts, guaranteeing perks like special seating,
tickets, or even an invitation to the team banquet at the end
of the season in exchange for a specified donation amount.35
But what dollar amount actually buys a donor influence over
the program?
II: DONOR VS. INSTITUTION: LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS AND
DISPUTES
Typically, the process of making a major gift to a college,
university, or other non-profit organization does not merely
consist of writing, signing and handing over a multi-million
dollar check. Accounting for the institution’s needs and the
33. Strode, supra note 10, at 84.
34. The numerous benefits Shapiro provided to players at the University of Miami
included “cash, jewelry, prostitutes, parties in his mansions and on his yacht, elaborate
meals and nights out at expensive nightclubs and strip bars, bonuses for athletes’ play
on the field, special bonuses for injuring players on another team, and, in one instance,
an abortion for a stripper a player had impregnated.” U. of Miami’s ‘Booster
Bombshell’: ‘The Craziest Scandal in NCAA History’, THE WEEK (Aug. 19, 2011, 1:13
PM),
http://theweek.com/article/index/218426/u-of-miamis-booster-bombshell-thecraziest-scandal-in-ncaa-history.
35. See, e.g., Longhorn Foundation: 2011 Benefits Chart, TEXASSPORTS.COM,
http://www.texassports.com/ sports/lfoundation/spec-rel/benefits-chart.html (last visited
Nov. 11, 2012).
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donor’s preference, gifts may be either designated for a
specific purpose or unrestricted.36 Often, when a donor
decides to make a major financial contribution, he intends the
gift to be used for a specific purpose.37 A donor is free to
dictate his own specific purpose for a gift, such as the
construction of a new building, support for a particular
program, or whatever else he chooses.38
However, the
institution is not required to accept a restricted gift that it
does not intend to honor.39 “[I]n practice most major gifts are
negotiated agreements between the donor and the nonprofit’s
executive or board leadership.”40 Institutions recognize the
importance of discussing gift restrictions with major donors
prior to accepting their contributions, and the necessity of
preserving the terms in a written gift instrument to avoid
future misunderstandings.41
Under the Restatement of Property, donor intent is the
paramount consideration when interpreting a gift
instrument.42 The provisions a donor chooses to include in a
gift agreement are particularly valuable to the determination
of a gift’s identity, as remedies available to both donor and
donee are contingent upon a court’s interpretation of the
donative document. If a donor chooses to give an unrestricted
gift to an institution, it is presumed that the donor gives with
both hands and relinquishes all interest and control upon the
gift’s completion.43 In contrast, a trust is created when a
donor manifests his will to create a fiduciary relationship
between himself and a trustee, and the donor subjects the
trustee to a duty to use the trust for a stated purpose.44
Finally, if a donor chooses to attach express conditions to his
gift, the donee’s interest may be subject to forfeiture or
reversion in the event that the donee fails to meet the
requirements or conditions set forth by the donor in the deed
36. Unrestricted gifts are those given without any strings attached and available
to use as the institution sees fit. See JULIA I. WALKER, NONPROFIT ESSENTIALS: MAJOR
GIFTS 3 (2006).
37. Id. at 2.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 10.1 (2003).
43. THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 324.
44. Id.
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of gift.45
When it is uncertain whether the provisions in a gift
agreement create a trust or a restricted gift, courts generally
favor an interpretation of the former over the latter.46 As one
court explained, “[b]ecause forfeiture is a harsh remedy, any
ambiguity is resolved against it.”47 In the event that a
condition is breached however, forfeiture is the required legal
remedy.48 Where the language of a document is ambiguous as
to donor intent, courts opt to construe the instrument in a
manner that will more effectively confer a benefit to the
public.49 However, if a donor clearly manifests his intent to
create a restricted gift, that intention will be honored.50
In L.B. Research and Education Foundation v. UCLA
Foundation, a California court grappled with the question of
whether a deed of gift constituted a charitable trust or a
restricted gift.51 In that case, a donor had contributed $1
million to UCLA for the establishment of an endowed chair at
UCLA’s medical school.52 The plaintiff Foundation claimed
that the conditions attached to the gift had been ignored, and
filed suit against the University demanding that the funds be
transferred to the University of California, San Francisco,
School of Medicine.53 Upon UCLA’s motion for dismissal, the
court was forced to delineate the differences between a
charitable trust and a conditional gift.54
Citing the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, the court
defined “charitable trust” as the intentional creation of a
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. L.B. Research & Educ. Found. v. UCLA Found., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710, 714
(2005).
48. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 324
(2012) (“Courts of equity are hostile to conditions and the harsh forfeitures which they
involve.”).
49. Id.
50. L.B. Research, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 714. While the law requires that courts
utilize a donor’s intention as their compass in determining the meaning of a deed of gift,
there is dissention among courts and commentators over the extent to which outside
documents and testimony, i.e., extrinsic evidence, may be used to ascertain the donor’s
intention. The majority fosters the “plain meaning rule,” which prohibits extrinsic
evidence from being introduced to contradict the plain meaning of the instrument’s
words.
51. L.B. Research, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 710.
52. Id. at 712.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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fiduciary relationship between donor and trustee.55
Additionally, the court identified three elements necessary for
its creation: intent, trust res, and charitable purpose.56 It
went on to distinguish a charitable trust from a restricted
gift.57 “The gift will be construed as one of a fee simple subject
to a condition subsequent if it is expressly provided in the
instrument that the transferee shall forfeit it or that the
transferor or his heir or a third party person may enter for
breach of the condition.”58
In ascertaining the intent of the parties, the court was
required to rely upon the “writing as a whole,” and concluded
that the instrument indeed conferred a restricted gift.59 The
court found that the writing demonstrated an intent that the
fund revert to a contingent donee in the event that UCLA did
not use it for its designated purpose.60 The court concluded
that L.B. Research intended to impose an enforceable
obligation on UCLA to use the money in accordance with the
stated conditions.61 The University contested, however, that
because the gift agreement did not contain an express
forfeiture provision, it could not be construed as a restricted
gift.62 The court responded by noting that, although UCLA’s
failure to abide by the conditions outlined in the gift
agreement would not necessarily constitute a forfeiture for
the “entire University of California system,”63 it would
nevertheless constitute a forfeiture for UCLA’s medical
school, the institution specifically designated by the
Foundation as the donee.64 As L.B. Research shows, the
manner in which a court construes the language of a gift
instrument and interprets donative intent may significantly
impact not only the remedies available to a plaintiff donor,
but more importantly, whether the merits of the donor’s claim
55. Id. at 713; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 11 (1959).
56. L.B. Research, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713-15.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 714; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 11 (1959).
59. Id. at 715-16.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 715 (citing City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, 82 Cal. Rptr.
2d 859 (1999)).
62. L. B. Research, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 715.
63. Id. at 715-16.
64. Id. at 716 (“Because UCLA’s loss will be UC San Francisco’s gain, the nature of
this forfeiture supports rather than defeats L.B. Research’s position and does not
require adoption of a view antagonistic to the donor’s charitable intent.”).
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will survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss.65
Though this concept seems to contradict the deference
given to donor intent discussed in the previous section, a
donor lacks standing at common law to enforce the terms of a
completed gift, unless he or she expressly reserves the right to
do so.66 This provision may appear in an instrument as a
right of reverter or as a right to redirect.67 Therefore,
hypothetically, to effectively bring a private lawsuit and
reclaim his funds, Robert Burton’s deed of gift to UConn
would have had to contain both a provision reserving him the
right to be consulted during the coach selection process, and a
reversion. If a gift instrument does not contain such language,
an aggrieved donor’s only hope for recourse rests with the
attorney general, who, at common law, has the authority to
enforce the provisions of a donative instrument.68
The power delegated to the attorney general to enforce
charitable gifts stems from the English common law notion of
the Crown as parens patriae.69 Historically, the Crown bore
the exclusive responsibility to “facili[tate] the alleviation of
suffering among its most vulnerable subjects,” and, as an
agent for the Crown, the attorney general was burdened with
the duty of enforcing charitable gifts.70 This state interest in
the enforcement of charitable funds resonates today, as the
common law remains an important source of authority for
state attorneys general to enforce donor intent.71 “Where
property is given to a charitable corporation and it is directed
by the terms of the gift to devote the property to a particular
one of its purposes, it is under a duty, enforceable at the suit
of the Attorney General, to devote the property to that
purpose.”72
In recent decades, however, the attorney general’s role in
the enforcement of charitable gifts has been criticized as
antiquated and inadequate.73 The offices of attorneys general
65. Id. at 716-17.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f (1959).
67. Id.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959).
69. Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society Vs.
Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1136 (2005) [hereinafter Goodwin].
70. Id.
71. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f (1959).
73. Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1138.
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are notoriously understaffed and underfunded, and the duties
of this public official extend far beyond mere oversight of
charitable gifts.74 But while the expansion of individual
standing to bring enforcement suits would potentially
alleviate this problem, courts have been reluctant to grant
standing to private parties for fear of unnecessary lawsuits
that would likely drain charitable assets.75 Because public
benefit is the essence of a public charity, it is rational to
conclude that these organizations “must be protected from
harassment and loss.”76 Thus, courts have been wary to open
their doors to private parties who lack a tangible stake in the
charitable property.77
Some state courts, however, have opted to relax standing
requirements as they pertain to beneficiaries of a charitable
trust or gift on a subjective basis by implementing the special
interest doctrine.78 A court may invoke the special interest
doctrine to determine whether a plaintiff’s affiliation with a
charity entitles him to standing.79 Factors that the court
weighs include: the act(s) spurring the cause of action, the
remedy sought by the plaintiff, fraud or misconduct by the
charity or its directors, the nature of the benefitted class and
its relationship to the charity, and the attorney general’s
availability or effectiveness.80
Had the court in L.B. Research and Education Foundation
v. UCLA Foundation interpreted the donative instrument as a
trust rather than a restricted gift, the Foundation’s
opportunity for judicial remedy would have been diminished –
at least in some capacity. The Foundation would have been
required to conjure additional arguments and justifications to
establish its standing without the aid of the attorney general.
The court presented those potential arguments sua sponte,
and determined that even if the language of the donative
document were read to construct a charitable trust, the
Foundation would nonetheless be entitled to individual
standing to sue because it satisfied the qualifications of an

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1139.
Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 756 (N.Y. 1985).
Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1140.
Id.
Id. at 1141.
Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. c (1959).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. c (1959).
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interested party.81 Conceptually, a lawsuit brought by a party
that demonstrates the requisite special interest in an
institution’s objectives is less likely to be frivolous.82 For this
reason, courts have become increasingly comfortable granting
standing to beneficiaries and other interested parties who
seek “to uphold the best interests of the charity.”83 Despite
this kink in the general rule, when it comes to donor-initiated
suits, courts have, for the most part, elected to continue to
apply the common law decree that the attorney general is the
designated enforcer of charitable gifts.84 Moreover, state
legislatures typically have refused to afford statutory relief to
individual donors vexed by the standing problem.85
Prior to the creation of a concise set of uniform laws, an
ambivalent mix of trust law, corporate law and contract law
governed disputes arising between donors and institutions.86
The inconsistent application of these doctrines proved to be
“disadvantageous for both the donors and the charitable
institutions receiving their gifts.”87 For instance, governing
boards and trustees typically enjoyed greater freedom under a
corporate standard, but were confined to very strict
parameters under trust law.88 As a result of these judicial
81. L.B. Research, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 717-18.
82. Id.
83. Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1142, 1148 (“In the past, the courts automatically
accorded [founders and endowers] a power of ‘visitation’ to supervise their gifts once
given, treating the reservation of visitorial power as inherent in the endowing of a
corporate charity. The early cases based the doctrine on the power everyone has to
dispose, direct, and regulate his own property. Today, we do not recognize that property
given by a donor to charity remains in any sense ‘his own.’ Nevertheless, there was a
rationale for allowing such rights. A founder had a natural reason to know and care
about the charity’s operations. Also, permitting him to sue would not expose the charity
to vexatious litigation from indifferent members of the public.”).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f. (1959) (“Where property is
given to a charitable corporation and it is directed by the terms of the gift to devote the
property to a particular one of its purposes, it is under a duty, enforceable at the suit of
the Attorney General, to devote the property to that purpose.”); But see L.B. Research
and Educ. Found. v. UCLA Found., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710 (2005), where court deemed
plaintiff donor was entitled to standing as a responsible individual with a legitimate
interest in the charitable trust.
85. Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1143; See, e.g., Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ.
of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 996 (1997).
86. Rachel M. Williams, Note, Transitioning from UMIFA to UPMIFA: How the
Promulgation of the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act Will
Affect Donor-Initiated Lawsuits Brought Against Colleges and Universities, 37 J.C. &
U.L. 201, 205 (2010) [hereinafter Williams].
87. Id.
88. Douglas M. Salaway, UMIFA and a Model For Endowment Investing, 22 J.C.
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inconsistencies, much of the pertinent case law was reduced
to “a series of seemingly disjointed cases that made it difficult
for governing boards and their attorneys to predict judicial
judgment.”89
On the plaintiff donor’s end, the odds of choosing a
winning offensive strategy to enforce the terms of his or her
gift were equally dubious, and the problem was compounded
by the fact that “donors did not have, and still do not have,
standing to sue a charity for non-compliance with donorimposed restrictions.”90 Despite the slim chance that a court
would hear the merits of their claims, many donors turned to
the courts for remedy, only to have their claims dismissed for
lack of standing.91 And still, in the limited number of
instances where a donor was able to get a foot in the door and
voice his or her grievances, it was the court’s tendency to
extend protection to the defendant institution.92
To encourage uniformity and consistency in the
governance of donative funds, forty-eight states and the
District of Columbia, have adopted statutes based upon
regulations created and endorsed by the Uniform Law
Commission.93 The Uniform Management of Institutional
Funds Act (“UMIFA”), which was the first uniform law
constructed to guide the investment and management of
charitable gifts, was drafted in 1972.94
UMIFA was
& U.L. 1045, 1064 (1996) [hereinafter Salaway].
89. Id. at 1065.
90. Williams, supra note 86, at 207; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt.
f, (1959) (“Where property is given to a charitable corporation and it is directed by the
terms of the gift to devote the property to a particular one of its purposes, it is under a
duty, enforceable at the suit of the Attorney General, to devote the property to that
purpose.”).
91. Id. at 228 (“The most highly litigated issue seems to be whether there is donor
standing to bring a lawsuit to object to the use of funds or enforce a restriction.”).
92. See Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Quincy, 258 N.E.2d 745, 753 (Mass. 1970)
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk court refused to enforce a donor’s
gift restrictions despite the fact that the donor expressly intended for those provisions
to be mandatory); See also Wilbur v. Univ. of Vt., 270 A.2d 889 (Vt. 1970) (Supreme
Court of Vermont held that a university’s violation of the terms of a gift agreement
“[did] not entitle the settlor or his successor to enforce” the restrictions outlined in the
instrument).
93. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org (last visited Oct. 11,
2011) (The Uniform Law Commission “provides states with non-partisan, wellconceived and well-drafted legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical areas
of the law.”).
94. UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on
Unif. State Laws 1972).
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revolutionary in that it established, for the first time,
“uniform and fundamental rules for the investment of funds
held by charitable institutions and the expenditure of funds
donated as ‘endowments’ to those institutions.”95
The Uniform Law Commission drafted UMIFA to
ameliorate conflicts and strike a balance of interests between
plaintiff donors and defendant institutions regarding donative
intent and gift restrictions 96 To accommodate charitable
institutions bestowed with gifts bearing impracticable
provisions, UMIFA permitted the release of donor-imposed
restrictions in certain circumstances.97
Conversely, to
safeguard donor intent, particular regulations imposed by
UMIFA could be limited or even annulled by a written
agreement between the parties.98 In general, the overarching
aim of the Uniform Law Commission in drafting UMIFA was
to ensure that “funds held by charitable institutions [were]
managed and used prudently and according to the donor’s
intentions without deterring the operation of the charity or
unduly restricting its ability to respond to changes in the
world.”99
In 2006, the Uniform Law Commission gave UMIFA a
facelift, revamping and updating the laws governing the
management and investment of institutional funds by
promulgating the Uniform Prudent Management of
Institutional Funds Act (“UPMIFA”).100 While UPMIFA’s
primary objective is not unlike that of UMIFA’s, the new Act
“modernized” its predecessor in several respects.101 Notably,
the 2006 revision sought to liberalize the conditions under
which donor-imposed restrictions can be modified by a
95. Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act Summary, UNIFORM LAW
COMMISSION,
http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Prudent%20Management%20of%20Inst
itutional%20Funds%20Act (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
96. Williams, supra note 86, at 208.
97. UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 7 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs
on Unif. State Laws 1972).
98. See, e.g., UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT §§ 3, 4, 5 (Nat’l
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 1972); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF
INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT §§ 3(a), 3(e), 4(a), 4(b) (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif.
State Laws 2006); UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 1 cmt. (Nat’l
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 1972) (The UMIFA considered any writing
that “establishes the terms of the gift” to be an authoritative “gift instrument.”)
99. Williams, supra note 86, at 208.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348, cmt. f, (1959).
101. Williams, supra note 86, at 208.
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charitable institution.102 Under the original provisions of
UMIFA, an institution was unable to rely upon the courts for
legal modification or release of donor-imposed restrictions.103
While a restriction can be modified or released by merely
obtaining written consent from the donor, in practice,
“obtaining donor consent can be impossible, at worst, or
extremely burdensome, at least.”104 To rectify this matter, the
Uniform Law Commission chose to supplement UPMIFA’s
provisions with the trust doctrines of cy pres and equitable
deviation.105
The incorporation of these doctrines was
intended not only to broaden the scope of judicial remedy
available to institutions paralyzed by donor-imposed gift
restrictions, but also to foster “an approach that favors
modification over release to protect donor intent.”106
Yet despite the Uniform Laws’ mutual missions to
mitigate conflicts between donors and institutions, in the
years since its original enactment and its 2006 revitalization,
donors have rarely relied upon UMIFA or UPMIFA in
bringing lawsuits against colleges and universities. Rather,
donors who actually see their claims survive to trial have
reverted to more traditional principles of contract law, trust
law, or corporate law to back the substance of their suits.107
The use of these legal doctrines “precludes the use of UMIFA’s
principles of interpretation in any way because contract,
trust, or corporate law will be applied in a manner

102. Id. at 209.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 214.
105. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6(c) (Nat’l Conference
of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2006); JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS, 701 (3d ed., Foundation Press 2007) (1998) (Using cy pres, a
court is able to modify, in some way, a donor’s instruction on the use or purpose of a
gift. However, any modifications sought by an institution as to the purpose of a donor’s
gift must be consistent with the donor’s intent as articulated in the gift instrument. A
court’s decision to apply the doctrine of cy pres in trust law is dependent upon the
charitable institution’s ability to demonstrate: (1) that the gift was given “to a
charitable organization for a charitable purpose”; (2) that it is “impossible, impractical
or illegal to carry out the donor’s stated charitable purpose”; and (3) “that the donor had
general charitable intent.”); Williams, supra note 85, at 217 (“Equitable deviation
applies under virtually the same circumstances as cy pres, except that it applies not to
the purpose of a fund but to the means used to carry out that purpose.”).
106. Susan N. Gary, Charities, Endowments, and Donor Intent: The Uniform
Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, 41 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1328 (2007).
107. Id.
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corresponding to the parties’ characterization of the case.”108
In the vast majority of cases, however, donors are unable to
advance the ball far enough to even utilize an offensive
strategy. Lack of standing is an aggrieved donor’s most
formidable opponent, and as a result, the substantive issues
underlying a donor’s claim for enforcement of the terms of a
gift are rarely adjudicated. In order for the merits of donorinitiated lawsuits to be heard and remedied, donors first must
find a way to clear the hurdle of standing. As demonstrated
by the Supreme Court of Connecticut’s decision in Carl J.
Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, however,
the Uniform Laws are of little utility.
In 1997, the Supreme Court of Connecticut reaffirmed the
preeminence of the common law standard when it held that
the Carl J. Herzog Foundation lacked standing to enforce the
terms of its $250,000 gift to the University of Bridgeport.109
For some time prior to the cause of action, the Carl J. Herzog
Foundation (herein “Foundation”) gave money to Bridgeport
University (herein “University”) to provide need-based merit
scholarships to disadvantaged students demonstrating an
interest in the medical field.110 On August 12, 1986, the
Foundation wrote a letter to the University agreeing to
participate in a “matching grant program” that essentially
extended
their
previously
established
donor-donee
relationship.111
In the letter, the Foundation expressly
outlined its intent that the funds go to “disadvantaged
students for medical related education on a continuing
basis.”112 Several weeks later, on September 9, 1986, the
Foundation received an acceptance letter from the University
in which it agreed to a $250,000 grant match arrangement.113
Over a period of two years, both parties fulfilled their
respective obligations.114 The University raised the agreedupon sum of $250,000, and the Foundation matched it, paying
$144,000 in June 1987 and $106,000 approximately one year
later.115 In accordance with the Foundation’s wishes, the
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 229.
Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 996 (1997).
Id. at 996.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Herzog Found., 699 A.2d at 996.

LEONE_TWO CENTS

2013]

1/31/2013 5:26 PM

Buying Influence in College Athletics

239

grant money was used to provide scholarships to students
enrolled in the University’s nursing program.116 In June
1991, however, the University closed its nursing school.117
The Foundation filed suit against the University requesting a
“temporary and permanent injunction [and] ordering the
defendant ‘to segregate from its general funds matching
grants totaling $250,000.’”118 The Foundation also demanded
an accounting for the fund and insisted that it be
reestablished in conformance with the purposes expressed in
the original gift instrument.119
The complaint further
asserted that if the University could not satisfy the terms of
the original agreement, the funds were to be redirected to the
Bridgeport Area Foundation.120
Herzog Foundation presents one of the rare examples
where a plaintiff donor attempted to premise both the
substance of its claim as well as its entitlement to standing on
a state’s adoption of UMIFA.121
In its complaint, the
Foundation articulated its belief that the institutional funds
had been intermixed with University’s general funds, and
that the money was not being used in accordance with the
terms of the gift instrument.122 Following the trial court’s
initial dismissal of the Foundation’s suit for lack of standing
and the appellate court’s subsequent reversal, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut decided to hear the case.123 The question
before the court was whether the state legislature, by
adopting UMIFA, intended to arm charitable donors with
standing to enforce the terms of a completed gift when the gift
instrument in question “contained no express reservation of
control over the disposition of the gift.”124
Reiterating the Restatement (Second) of Trusts and citing
case law from an array of jurisdictions, the court reaffirmed
the common law principle that unless a donor expressly
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing the statement of facts presented by the lower court in Carl J. Herzog
Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 677 A.2d 1378, 1380 (1996), rev’d, 699
A.2d 995 (1997)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Herzog Found., 699 A.2d at 996. (In this specific case, the Connecticut Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act, or “CUMIFA”).
122. Id. at 996.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 997.
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retained a right of control expressed as a restricted gift, the
state attorney general was vested with the exclusive
authority to bring an action to remedy the mishandling of a
trust.125 The court concluded that the Connecticut legislature
did not intend for the Uniform Act to supplant the common
law.126 Specifically, the court cited a comment authored by
UMIFA’s drafters, which stated: “The donor has no right to
enforce the restriction, no interest in the fund and no power to
change the [] beneficiary of the fund. He may only acquiesce
in a lessening of a restriction already in effect.”127 As such,
the Foundation was denied standing.128
Although donors sought to find relief in UMIFA and
UPMIFA, the uniform laws have been of little utility to
aggrieved donors seeking to direct and control the use of a
completed, unrestricted gift. A plaintiff donor lacks standing
at common law to enforce the terms of a completed gift unless
he expressly reserves the right to do so in the gift instrument
negotiated with the donee institution. Thus, to avoid conflicts
regarding the terms of a gift agreement, it is imperative that
before completing a donation, the terms and expectations of
the gift are discussed and settled by the parties. If an
institution or organization willingly accepts a restricted gift,
however, they become legally obligated to enforce and abide
by the terms of that gift.129
III: VENTURE PHILANTHROPY, SPECIAL INTERESTS AND A
BREAKTHROUGH FOR DONOR STANDING
Despite the growing trend towards gift control and
oversight, the law remains partial to unconditional, no125. Id. at 998.
126. Id. at 999-1000.
127. Herzog Found., 699 A.2d at 1001.
128. Id. at 1002.
129. Regardless of the amount, some restricted gifts are simply too cumbersome for
institutions to accept. In 1907, Swarthmore College received coal lands and mineral
rights worth an estimated $1-$3 million from wealthy Quaker Anna T. Jeanes. At the
time, Swarthmore’s entire endowment was only worth $1 million. Ms. Jeanes
conditioned her gift, however, stating in her will that Swarthmore would only receive
the land if the college permanently “discontinue[d] and abandon[ed] all participation in
intercollegiate athletics, sports and games.” Unwilling to sacrifice its athletic programs,
Swarthmore refused the gift. See Will Treece, The Football Controversy Through the
COLLEGE
DAILY
GAZETTE
(Oct.
7,
2009),
Ages,
SWARTHMORE
http://daily.swarthmore.edu/2009/10/07/athletics/.
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strings-attached philanthropy.130 This intersection – where a
donor’s desire for control meets the law’s preference for
unrestricted giving – has spawned numerous legal battles. In
spite of the law’s persistent efforts to foster the notion of
unrestricted philanthropic giving and stifle the growing
interest in gift control and oversight, donors and charitable
foundations began seeking alternatives to conventional
giving. “Venture philanthropy” is a term used to describe
private donors’ and foundations’ inclination in recent years to
adopt strategies and methods employed in the for-profit
world.131 Instead of relinquishing control upon the completion
of a charitable gift, a venture philanthropist’s contribution to
a non-profit organization may be premised on specific terms
and conditions agreed upon by the parties.132 Often, the donor
retains the ability to provide business advice to the
organization or serve in a managerial capacity.133
In 1971, decades before the term “venture philanthropist”
was coined, Brink Smithers made a $10 million gift to
Roosevelt Hospital134 (“the Hospital”) in New York City for the
establishment of an alcohol rehabilitation center.135 Per his
zealous advocacy of new treatment mechanisms and his
generous monetary gift, Mr. Smithers “affected a revolution in
the treatment of alcoholism and brought about the
professionalization of the field.”136 In his initial letter of
intent to the Hospital, Mr. Smithers reserved significant
responsibilities for himself as a donor, such as requiring that
specific “project plans and staff appointments have his
approval.”137 It was Smithers’ fervent intent to maintain an
active role in the program.
Interestingly, despite Mr.
Smithers’ wealth of personal experience as a lifelong alcoholic,
he lacked any professional qualifications in the medical
field.138 The Hospital nevertheless accepted the gift with its
130. Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of
America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2439 (2005).
131. Rothschild, supra note 19, at 110.
132. Id. at 110-11.
133. Id.
134. Roosevelt Hospital later merged with St. Luke’s to become “Roosevelt/St.
Luke’s Hospital.”
135. Smithers, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 426. Mr. Smithers was not only a pioneer as a
venture philanthropist, but also in his conviction that alcoholism was a disease.
136. Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1096.
137. Smithers, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 427.
138. Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1096.
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terms, and Smithers’ vision culminated in the founding of the
Smithers Alcoholism Treatment and Training Center
(“Smithers Center”) in New York City.139
In response to adverse economic conditions, including
Medicaid budget cuts, the Hospital began to consider making
changes to its alcohol rehabilitation program.140 Specifically,
it contemplated the sale of an Upper East Side in-patient
facility.141 Mr. Smithers, maintaining an active role in the
management of the program, vigilantly opposed the sale of
the Upper Eastside house and contested that it was “integral
to the program under the terms of his gift.”142 Despite the
escalating tension between Smithers and the Hospital
regarding the gift’s donative intent, the house was not sold
during Smithers’ lifetime.143 After Smithers’ death in 1995,
however, the Hospital moved forward with its plan, and Mrs.
Smithers, administratrix of her late husband’s estate, sought
the help of the attorney general to prevent the sale.144
Dissatisfied with the attorney general’s handling of the
matter, Mrs. Smithers pursued judicial remedy in 2001.145
The Smithers decision constitutes a turning point in donorinitiated litigation because, for the first time, the traditional
obstacles to donor standing were circumvented. Although the
New York Court of Appeals acknowledged the state attorney
general’s role in the enforcement of charitable gifts, it
nevertheless chose to raise, sua sponte, whether the attorney
The court
general’s delegated right was exclusive.146
determined that the plaintiff administratrix, Mrs. Smithers,
had standing consistent with that of the attorney general to
pursue her gift enforcement claim against the defendant
hospital.147
In its analysis, the court looked to Associated Alumni of
General Theological Seminary v. General Theological
Seminary, a decision rendered by the New York Appellate
Division and later affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Smithers, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 427.
Goodwin, supra note 69, at1097.
Smithers, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 428-29.
Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1097.
Smithers, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 428-29.
Id. at 430-32.
Id.
Id. at 431-32.
Id.
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in 1900.148
In that case, various alumni of General
Theological Seminary had given funds to the institution for
the purpose of endowing a professorship.149 In the gift
instrument, the alumni attached certain conditions to the
endowment, specifically reserving a right of nomination in the
event that the chair became vacant.150 When conflict arose
between the alumni association and the institution regarding
those conditions, the alumni filed suit against the
Seminary.151 The lower court held that, due to the plaintiff’s
retention of the right of nomination, it was entitled to
standing as a donor.152 After allowing the alumni association
standing, the court was able to address the merits of the
plaintiff’s claim and determined that the Seminary had
indeed violated the provisions of the gift agreement.153
Although the New York Court of Appeals upheld arguably
the most important aspect of the lower court’s ruling in
Associated Alumni regarding a donor’s right to standing, it
altered the remedy, ordering specific performance from the
defendant institution rather than monetary refund.154 The
New York Court of Appeals reasoned that in order for a gift to
be refunded to a donor, a right of reversion must be an
express provision in the gift instrument.155 Because such a
condition was not included in the alumni association’s deed of
gift, merely returning the money to the donor was an
improper remedy, as doing so would virtually dissolve the
trust.156 Due to its reservation of nomination, however, the
court held that the alumni association had sufficient standing
to maintain its action for the gift’s enforcement.157
In rendering the Smithers decision, the court reasoned
that, although Mr. Smithers had not retained a reversion, he
nevertheless “retained a supervisory role with respect to [his]
gift and indeed had served in this supervisory role,” not
148. Id. at 432.
149. Assoc. Alumni of the Gen. Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal
Church in the United States of Am. v. Gen. Theological Seminary of the Protestant
Episcopal Church in the United States, 163 N.Y. 417, 420 (1900).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 422.
153. Id. at 421-22.
154. Id. at 422.
155. Assoc. Alumni, 163 N.Y. at 421-22.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 422.
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dissimilar from the right of nomination reserved by the
donors in Associated Alumni.158 The court articulated that
Smithers’ retention of an oversight role was therefore enough
to arm his estate with standing to enforce the terms of his
gift.159 Furthermore, the court justified Mrs. Smithers’ right
to standing by distinguishing her from other disinterested
plaintiffs the common law standard intended to shun.160
Unlike those plaintiffs who may bring “vexatious litigation”
against a charity despite having no tangible stake in the
outcome, the court noted that Mrs. Smithers had served a
critical function in monitoring the Hospital’s compliance with
the terms of the gift.161 Additionally, the court observed that
Mrs. Smithers had demonstrated far greater interest and
diligence in the matter of preserving her late husband’s
mission than did the attorney general.162
CONCLUSION
Relying upon the logic of Smithers, major donors in college
sports inarguably demonstrate special interest and dedication
to the success and prosperity of their chosen institution.
Furthermore, certain donors and boosters indeed have the
qualifications and experience to make educated, rational,
informed decisions regarding the direction of an athletic
program. Robert Burton, for example, played football both
collegiately and professionally, and may have been justified in
stating that “[he is] fully qualified to assess coaches and their
ability to match up with [UConn’s] needs.”163 Advocating
venture philanthropy in the realm of collegiate athletics
would theoretically allow these interested parties – armed
with a vision for a program’s success – to permissively buy
access, influence, and power through monetary contributions.
Irrefutably, Burton’s contribution to UConn Football
enhanced the program.
The new facility became a
158. Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1155.
159. Smithers, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
160. See id. at 435 (asserting that “Mrs. Smithers herself. . .ha[d] her own special,
personal interest in the enforcement of the Gift restrictions imposed by her husband, as
[was] manifest from her own fundraising work on behalf of the Smithers Center and the
fact that the gala that she organized and that the Hospital ultimately cancelled was to
be in her honor as well as her husband’s.”).
161. See Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1155.
162. Id.
163. Burton letter, supra note 1.
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cornerstone of the program, and was a catalyst for its rise to
prominence. Hiring an adept, qualified coach is equally vital
to shaping a successful program. Yet there remains a palpable
discrepancy between the two – while we encourage and
commend major donors for the facilities they construct and
the equipment they provide, there is something unsavory
about allowing a major donor to explicitly “buy” influence over
coaching decisions at the collegiate level.164 Put differently, if
the NCAA is indeed attempting to preserve the integrity and
amateurism of college athletics, then there may be something
inherently wrong with fostering a model of venture
philanthropy and allowing boosters to reserve supervisory
and nomination rights in college athletics.
On the other hand, the watchful eye of the NCAA may
serve as a sufficient restriction allowing venture philanthropy
to improve intercollegiate competition, athletic facilities, and
coaching staffs during an economic downturn when
institutions need it most. The cost of staying competitive in
Division I athletics continues to rise each year. Given the
instability of our nation’s current economic climate, colleges
and universities will be forced to solicit contributions from
donors in order to sustain their athletic programs and
maintain a presence in the Division I arms race. As research
on donor motivation demonstrates, there is indeed a growing
market for major donors seeking access and influence in
college sports.
If philanthropy’s trend towards control
continues, it is plausible that institutions may be inclined to
accept restricted gifts from major donors seeking to be
consulted in athletic department decisions.
Conceptually, collegiate donors like Robert Burton are not
all that different from Brink Smithers. Each had a special
interest in their respective institutions’ goal, and had a vision
for how to best attain that goal. The only difference between
these men is that Brink Smithers expressly retained the right
to oversee his dollars at work. Unfortunately for disgruntled
donors like Burton, however, this is the only difference that
legally matters. Until colleges and universities become more
164. Burton never expressly stated in his letter that he believed his monetary
contributions to UConn would allow him to select the next football coach. His
complaints related in large part to the lack of stewardship shown by UConn. Though
most institutions recognize the importance and value of nurturing and cultivating
relationships with their major donors, the fiduciary duty and stewardship owed to a
donor upon the completion of an unrestricted gift is premised entirely on good faith.
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willing to accept restricted gifts from donors seeking influence
and oversight, athletic departments and administrative
boards retain the right to leave their donors – even multimillion dollar donors like Robert Burton – out in the cold
when it comes to decision-making.

